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RAWLS, JUSTICE, AND THE INCOME
TAX
Charles R. O'Kelley, Jr.*
I. INTRODUCTION
A heated debate rages in tax policy circles concerning whether
the federal personal income tax should be imposed on an accretion
base or on a consumption base.1 An accretion-type income tax
would define taxable income as the sum of (i) personal consump-
tion and (ii) net increase in wealth, occurring during the applicable
accounting period.2 A consumption-type income tax would define
taxable income as including only personal consumption. Stated
simply, a consumption-type income tax would allow a deduction
from gross income for the net addition to savings during the appli-
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law;, B.A., University of
the South, 1970; J.D., University of Texas at Austin, 1972; LLM., Harvard University, 1977.
' The classic discussion is N. KAIDOR, AN ExPsmrrumm TAx (1955). For the recent de-
bate, see Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HAv. L.
Rav. 1113 (1974); Warren, Fairness and a Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal In-
come Tax, 88 HARv. L. REV. 931 (1975); Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A
Reply to Professor Warren, 88 HARV. L. Rlv. 947 (1975); THE BRooKINGs INsvMrON,
WHAT SHOULD BE TAxED: INcom OR ExrEmNrrum? (J. Pechman ed. 1980); R. GOODE, TH
INDIDUvAL INcoME TAX 11-57 (1976); U.S. DFP'T OF TREASURY, BLUEPRINTS FOR BAsic TAx
REFORM 9-51 (1977) [hereinafter cited as BLuEPRamTs]; Kahn, The Place of Consumption
and Net-Worth Taxation in the Federal Tax Structure, in BRoAD-BAsm TAXES 133 (R.
Musgrave ed. 1973); Klein, Timing in Personal Taxation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 461 (1977); War-
ren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081 (1980).
2 H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INcOME TAXAxrON 50 (1938), contains the oft-cited definition of
income as total accretion: "Personal income may be defined as the algebraic sum of (1) the
market value of rights exercised in consumption and (2) the change in the value of the store
of property rights between the beginning and the end of the period in question."
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cable accounting period, but an accretion-type income tax would
not. Thus, if in year one an individual earns $200 and spends $100,
his or her taxable income would be $200 under an accretion-type
income tax and $100 under a consumption-type income tax.3
The importance of the debate is better illustrated by comparing
individuals having the same level of consumption, but different
amounts of pre-tax income. Consider individual A who in year one
earns and spends $20,000 and individual B who in year one earns
$1,000,000, but only spends $20,000. Under a pure accretion-type
income tax, A and B would each have taxable income equal to
their pre-tax receipts. However, in a pure consumption-type in-
come tax A and B would each have a taxable income of $20,000.
Thus, for individuals with different money incomes but the same
total annual expenditures for personal consumption, the choice be-
tween an accretion-based and a consumption-based income tax will
greatly affect their relative tax burdens. A will have a slightly
greater tax burden under a consumption-type income tax than
under an accretion-type income tax, while B will have a signifi-
cantly lower income tax bill under a consumption-type income tax
than under an accretion-type income tax.4
As in most policy debates, discussants compare the competing
models to determine which is the more equitable, efficient, and
practicable." However, the answer suggested by an ad hoc weighing
of these factors will not necessarily be a just answer, and it would
be agreed by all of us that we are constrained to seek a just an-
3 The major difficulties in implementing an accretion-type income tax are the proper
treatment of unrealized changes in net worth, the proper calculation of capital consumption
allowances, and the proper treatment of imputed income from such items as leisure and
services performed in the home by housewives. These problems will be ignored in this arti-
cle. For simplicity an accretion-type income tax should be thought of as one in which taxa-
ble income equals the gross amount received from wages and investment return. A con-
sumption-type income tax is one in which taxable income equals gross realized wages and
investment return less net savings or plus net dissavings.
' The assumptions being made are these: (1) total revenue needs remain constant; (2)
total personal income remains constant; (3) personal saving increases under a consumption-
type income tax. Increased saving will result in a lower total (national) taxable income and
thus a need for higher rates of tax. Those having income levels or consumption patterns
which preclude saving will thus pay more taxes under a consumption-type tax, while high
income individuals with low present consumption levels will pay dramatically lower tax bills.
5 See, e.g., Bradford, The Case for a Personal Consumption Tax, in THE BROOKINGS IN-
sTrrUTION, WHAT SHOULD BE TAXED: INCOME OR EXPENDITURE? 75-125 (J. Pechman ed.
1980).
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swer.6 Accordingly, the first task in any policy debate must be to
determine the limits placed on our debate by the requirements of
justice. Only then will we know the range of possible just solutions
from which we may choose. Indeed, we may discover that as to a
particular question there is no range of possible just solutions. In-
stead there is one required solution.
Questions about the appropriate rules and mechanisms of taxa-
tion are to begin with, then, questions about social justice. A soci-
ety is socially just if it justly divides and distributes the advan-
tages obtained from social cooperation and justly determines and
distributes the basic individual rights and duties collectively con-
stituting the terms and conditions of social cooperation. The actual
distributive shares of rights, advantages, and duties in any society
are determined by its major social institutions, including its system
of taxation.7 Because a just distribution is dependent upon a just
distributive mechanism, social justice exists only if the major social
institutions are justly designed.8
In a society which employs an income tax, distributive shares of
income are determined by subtracting from gross income the
amount of tax paid. An income tax is thus a part of society's di-
tributive mechanism and must be designed in accordance with the
governing principles of social justice.
In a society where the distributive shares of before-tax income
would be just if left undisturbed, an income tax must be designed
so that the after-tax distribution of income is also just. In such a
society an income tax is merely one of many possible revenue rais-
ing mechanisms. It serves no just purpose, but rather is con-
strained by requirements of justice. In such a society, the debate
would center on which income tax base should be used in order to
maintain the justness of the initial distribution of income. Argu-
ment would focus on how much income tax should be paid by peo-
6 This point is even acknowledged by one of the leading proponents of economic analysis.
Calabresi, About Law and Economics: A Letter to Ronald Dworkin, 8 HoFsTRA L Rzv. 553,
559 (1980): "[E]quating an appropriate efficiency-distribution mix with justice requires as-
sumptions that are neither intuitively obvious nor so widely accepted as to permit me to
say, 'Solve the problem of that mix and you have justice."' The point is straightforwardly
made in J. RAwLS, A THEORY OF JusTIcE 3 (1971): "[L]aws and institutions no matter how
efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust."
7 1 J. MML, PRINCIPLES OF PoLrrcAL EcONoy 258, 259 (5th London ed. 1883).
8 J. RAwLS, supra note 6, at 5.
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ple with differing amounts of justly held income.
Many of us would insist, however, that the pre-tax distribution
of income in our society is unjust. If this is so, then an income tax
is not merely one of several possible revenue raising devices. In-
stead it is an essential part of the distributive mechanism of soci-
ety. Its purpose must be to extract from each taxpayer the portion
of gross income that would make his or her distributive share un-
just if not extracted.
If the purpose of an income tax is to correct an unjust initial
distribution of income, then justice requires the use of an accre-
tion-type income tax. The unjust distribution of income is clearly
reflected by the relative amounts of pre-tax income9 and would be
clouded or totally masked by a consumption-type income tax.
Consider again individual A who in year one earns and spends
$20,000 and individual B who in year one earns $1,000,000, but
spends only $20,000. Under a consumption-type income tax A and
B would each have taxable incomes of $20,000, which taxable in-
comes would not reflect the relative unjustness of B's pre-tax in-
come."° Therefore, a consumption-type income tax would be una-
ble to correct an initially unjust distribution of income.1
If the pre-tax distribution of income is just, then debate may
proceed as to which definition of income is preferable. However, if
society's initial distribution of pre-tax income is unjust, we must
necessarily define income as net accretion to wealth, whether con-
sumed or saved. Accordingly, the first issue for those debating the
appropriate definition of income must be a determination of
whether the present distribution of pre-tax income is just. The an-
swer depends on whether or not the present distribution of pre-tax
income satisfies the governing principles of social justice.
The first issue resolves, therefore, into a question of social jus-
tice. It is generally felt, however, that questions of justice cannot
be meaningfully debated. Ultimately one's conception of justice is
' Doubt has been expressed concerning the correlation between gross income and unde-
served income. W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, THE UNEASY CASE FOR PROGRESSIVE TAXATION 81
(1963). For simplicity of illustration I ignore the problem in my textual discussion and do
not address the issue in this article. Certainly a major design problem for an ideal accretion-
based income tax would be insuring that there is a chain.connection between taxable in-
come and undeserved income.
10 There is no implication intended that A is entitled to his income.
'i See text accompanying notes 26, 31, & 73-74 infra.
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a matter of personal preference and to argue about such matters
"is to reduce the discussion frankly to the level of ethics or aes-
thetics. 12 Professor Andrews makes the point clearly in his influ-
ential article in favor of a consumption base:
Matters of fairness are not generally subject to logical demon-
stration from independent premises. All that reason can do is
to elaborate the implications of plausible hypotheses in order
to facilitate an informed choice among them. What we need to
do, therefore, is to examine the matter from both the equal-
earner and equal-consumer perspectives, recognizing that each
incorporates a certain assumption about how taxes are to be
distributed, and to reserve final judgment and choice between
these assumptions until after the implications of both have
been explored."3
Professor Andrews is correct to suggest that we cannot hope to
obtain unanimous agreement as to the requirements of justice.
However, he is engaged in a dangerous sleight of hand when he
suggests that as long as we recognize our underlying assumptions
we need not attempt to debate them. Instead, he suggests, we
should first consider which definition of income will be more prac-
ticable and efficient. Only if we are dissatisfied with the result of
this inquiry need we worry about matters of justice.
The danger of this approach is that it is calculated to avoid a
consideration of the justness of the underlying structure of society.
The focus of discussion is then on the inner workings of the ex-
isting system-admittedly the place lawyers feel most comfortable.
Focusing on the inner workings serves to reinforce the legitimacy
of the existing system and to further insulate it from criticism. 4
12 H. SmONS, supra note 2, at 18.
"S Andrews, Fairness and the Personal Income Tax: A Reply to Professor Warren, 88
HARv. L. Rav. 947, 950 (1975).
14 See H. MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN 172-73 (1964). Marcuse describes the result of
focusing only on the inner workings:
Philosophic thought turns into affirmative thought; the philosophic critique criticizes
within the societal framework and stigmatizes non-positive notions as mere specula-
tion, dreams or fantasies.
... The contemporary effort to reduce the scope and the truth of philosophy is
tremendous, and the philosophers themselves proclaim the modesty and inefficacy of
philosophy. It leaves the established reality untouched; it abhors transgression.
1981]
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Almost unconsciously, we are lulled into assuming that the basic
structure of society is just and that the pre-tax distribution of in-
come is just. Andrews himself has clearly fallen victim to this syn-
drome when he states that "[t]he nondiscrimination which is most
important as a matter of fairness is equal treatment of equal con-
sumers."15 As a matter of social justice the goal should instead be
stated to be equal treatment of equal consumers who are justly
entitled to what they spend. The Andrews formulation overlooks
the fundamental question of the justness of the pre-tax distribu-
tion of income. Dealing in common sense maxims and focusing
only on the internal working of the income tax thus not only
avoids the main issue-the requirements of justice-but also
serves to hide the issue from view. I believe, and intend to illus-
trate, that we can meaningfully discuss competing models of the
income tax only if we elaborate and discuss our underlying as-
sumptions about justice.
To the extent the primacy of justice is acknowledged in tax pol-
icy debate, such acknowledgment is coupled with the assertion
that, of course, questions of justice cannot be meaningfully de-
bated.16 The discussants then attempt to resolve the issue in ques-
tion by use of ad hoc arguments of fairness and efficiency. The
major purpose of this article is to show that not only is justice the
primary issue, but that questions of justice can be meaningfully
addressed. First, I will examine some of the ad hoc arguments of
fairness and efficiency which have been made by proponents of a
consumption base and will point out the unpersuasiveness of such
arguments when the primacy question of justice has not been ad-
dressed. Next, I will show that while true utilitarians would ac-
knowledge the primacy of justice, utilitarianism is no more persua-
sive than ad hoc maxims with respect to questions of justice. Next,
I will explain how the relative merits of competing principles of
social justice can be meaningfully debated by non-philosophers
within the framework for comparative philosophical analysis devel-
oped by John Rawls. I will then examine the principles of social
justice described by John Rawls and explain both the purpose that
Id. at 172, 173.
"o Andrews, supra note 13, at 949.
16 See Andrews, supra note 13, at 950; Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer
Than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE L.J. 1081, 1082 (1980).
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an income tax plays in a society structured in accordance with
these principles and the definition of income that should be
adopted by a society so structured. I will then consider the purpose
of the income tax and the indicated definition of income under a
libertarian theory of justice. Finally, I will illustrate the use of the
Rawlsian framework for comparative philosophical analysis by ex-
amining how libertarian principles of justice might be derived and
justified.
The scope of this article is thus limited in several respects. I do
not attempt to investigate the various design problems inherent in
an accretion-type income tax, though I intend to demonstrate at a
later date that such design problems can be solved once the role of
the income tax is clearly defined.17 Nor is there any attempt to
deal with collectivist objections to the Rawsian framework, though
I believe such objections can and should be met.1 8 Instead I limit
my task to making a prima facie case for the possibility of mean-
ingfully discussing questions of justice in connection with tax pol-
icy debate. 9
II. THE PROBLEM WITH Ad Hoc ARGUMENTS AND UTmIAmANISM
A. Discrimination Against Future Consumption
A frequently advanced argument against an accretion base is
that it discriminates against those with a relatively greater prefer-
ence for future consumption.2 ° Economists would argue that not
only is this a case of fairness, but that the accretion base violates
the principle of efficiency in that it causes consumers to change
their preference for present and future consumption, in favor of
present consumption. 1 An efficient tax would leave such choice
" In addition to the design problems described in note 3, supra, major problems are de-
termining the proper taxable unit, which personal deductions are consistent with the accre-
tion ideal, and what adjustments, if any, are required because of inflation.
IS For an introduction to these objections, see Fisk, History and Reason in Rawls' Moral
Theory, in READING RAwLs 53 (N. Daniels ed. 1974); Miller, Rawls and Marxism, id. at 206.
19 Of course, if meaningful debate is possible its utility is not limited to the tax area. I
emphasize tax policy because (with all due respect to Professor Kronman's pitch for con-
tract law-Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J. 472, 498-510
(1980)) any real gains in distributional equity in our society will occur through the mecha-
nism of taxation.
20 Andrews, A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow Personal Income Tax, 87 HAMI. L Rnv.
1167, 1167-69 (1974).
21 R. MUSGRAVE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIc FINANcE 260-63 (1959). See also Rosen, Is It
1981]
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unaffected. To understand these points, consider an example simi-
lar to the one used by Professors Andrews and Warren in their
dialogue concerning the fairness of a consumption-based income
tax.22 Worker A earns $200 in year one, of which $100 is spent to
support A's chosen standard of living. A has no investment income
for the year. In a world without taxes, A could save $100. If in-
vested at 9% interest, compounded semiannually, his savings
would in twenty-four years grow to $800.23 If instead A is subject
to a consumption-type income tax of 33%, he will pay $33 in tax,
leaving $67 to be saved. If invested at 9% interest, compounded
semiannually, this amount would in twenty-four years grow to
$533. The relative value of present consumption in comparison to
future consumption is one to eight in both a non-tax world and a
world with a consumption-type income tax. Thus a consumption-
type income tax does not discriminate against those with a rela-
tively greater preference for present or future consumption.
The imposition of an accretion-type tax does affect the relative
preference for present or future consumption. A 33% tax imposed
on A's gross income without allowance of a deduction for savings,
results in a tax of $67, reducing the amount available for invest-
ment to $33. Moreover the annual return on such investment will
be subject to tax. Thus $33 invested at 9% interest, compounded
semiannually will produce an after-tax accumulation of $133 after
twenty-four years-the same accumulation that would have re-
sulted under a consumption-type tax if the investment yield were
6% compounded semiannually. Under the accretion-type income
tax the ratio of funds available to Worker A for current consump-
tion in year one to the amount available in year twenty-four is only
one to four. Thus, unlike a consumption-type income tax, the ac-
cretion-type tax discriminates against those with a relatively
greater preference for future consumption. 4
Time to Abandon Joint Filing?, 30 NAT'L TAX J. 423, 426-27 (1977).
22 See Andrews, supra note 20; Warren, Fairness and A Consumption-Type or Cash Flow
Personal Income Tax, 88 HARv. L. Rav. 931, 934-37 (1975).
'3 See Andrews, supra note 20, at 1125 n.20: "There is a convenient rule of thumb that
says money invested at x percent per annum compound interest will double in 72/x years
.... Therefore, at 9% money will double three times in 24 years."
2 It should be noted that while the argument lends colorable support to the exemption
from taxable income of investment return, it lends no support at all to the exemption from
taxable income of amounts saved out of wages earned during the taxable year. Look again at
Worker A who in year one earns $200 and spends $100. If A is subject to a 33% rate of tax
[Vol. 16:1
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The logic of this argument is unassailable and seductive in its
appeal. As with all logical arguments, however, it is only as sound
as its premises. Absent is any explanation of why justice requires a
tax to be designed so as to leave consumers with the same relative
ability to consume in the future as they would have in a non-tax
world. This failure has three facets.
First, the amount of future consumption to which an individual
will be entitled is dependent upon the rate of investment return.25
However, the argument ignores the question of whether the pre-
tax distribution of investment return in our society is just. If this
cannot be demonstrated then justice requires that investment re-
turn be included in taxable income in order that taxable income
will reflect the relative unjustness of pre-tax income.20
There is a second flaw in the argument. Presumably the non-tax
world to which comparison is being made is a world with an ex-
isting regime of property rights.2 To establish that such is a
proper world with which to make comparison requires a showing
that the distribution of pre-tax income in such a non-tax world
would be just. Such a determination necessarily requires a consid-
eration of the justice of the preexisting scheme of property rights
because such preexisting regime will in large measure determine
the distribution of income.2 If the non-tax world and the pre-tax
under an accretion-type income tax but to no tax on investment return, then A will be able
to invest $33-in year one. If invested at 9% interest compounded semiannually such invest-
ment would grow to $267 after twenty-four years. If instead A is subject to a 33% rate of tax
under a consumption-type income tax, then A will be able to invest $67 in year one. In-
vested in the same manner described two sentences above, the amount accumulated after
twenty-four years would total $533. However, in either case the ratio of money available for
consumption in year one to money available in year twenty-four would be one to eight.
Thus, if investment return is exempted, an accretion-type income tax does not discriminate
against those with a relatively greater preference for present or future consumption.
15 For a related discussion, see Warren, supra note 16, at 1097-1101.
s See pp. 3-4 supra.
s' I make this assumption because in a state of nature, with no regime of property rights
in place, one's right to present or future consumption would not be dependent on law but on
force. Thus comparison to a state of nature would be meaningless.
Duncan Kennedy makes the same point with respect to judicial lawmaking in Kennedy,
Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication, 89 HARv. L. Rav. 1685, 1763 (1976):
But free bargaining presupposes an existing definition and distribution of property
rights.... It follows that the elimination of the effects of transaction costs on the
allocation of resources cannot provide an independent objective criterion for judicial
lawmaking. It is only possible to decide that these effects are bad if we can establish
that the outcome under some initial regime of legal rules, without transaction costs,
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distribution of income therein are unjust, then this hypothetical
non-tax world is irrelevant and comparison to it is without value.
The final flaw in this argument is seductive indeed. The gov-
erning maxim is stated to be that a tax should not discriminate
against those with a relatively greater preference for future con-
sumption. However, the illustrative example deals not with one
who merely has a relatively greater preference for future consump-
tion, but with one who has a relatively greater preference for trying
to exchange a certain amount of present consumption for a greater
amount of future consumption. Further, the example posits that
the investment will be successful. To illustrate this point, consider
a hypothetical world in which there is no inflation and in which
private investment can be made, but always with a risk of loss. In
such a world one who merely wished to defer consumption-that
is, one who did not wish to forego current consumption in the hope
that the unspent money can be parleyed into a larger sum-would
put his money in a sock or a safe deposit box. Thus, if Worker A
elects to save $100 in year one, he will still have $100 in year
twenty-four. An accretion base would have no effect on A's prefer-
ence for present or future consumption because there would be no
earnings produced by A's mere deferral of consumption.
B. Punishment of Consumption
One argument for a consumption-based income tax is that the
purpose of the income tax is to punish selfish behavior.20 Accord-
ingly, as Hobbes suggested, only consumption should be taxed.
For what reason is there, that he which laboureth much, and
sparing the fruits of his labour, consumeth little, should be
more charged, than he that living idly, getteth little, and
spendeth all he gets; seeing the one hath no more protection
from the commonwealth, than the other? 0
There are obvious objections to this argument. First, why is it
more selfish to spend than to save? Suppose individual A earns
and spends $25,000, while individual B earns $1,000,000 but only
would be good.
" Dyer, The Relative Fairness of the Consumption and Accretion Tax Bases, 1978 UTAH
L. REV. 457, 459.
10 T. HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 255 (M. Oakeshott ed. 1962).
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spends $20,000. Is it self-evident that A is more selfish than B who
is hoarding vast amounts of money, the spending of which might
stimulate the economy?
A second problem is the relationship of a condemnation of self-
ishness to a theory of social justice. The argument ignores, and
presumably presupposes, the justness of the pre-tax distribution of
income. Accordingly, a theory that selfishness in the form of con-
sumption should be the subject of a punitive tax is clearly a
subordinate principle of fairness. If the pre-tax distribution of in-
come is unjust, then an accretion-based income tax would be lev-
ied. Only if the pre-tax distribution of income is just can we con-
sider designing the income tax in accordance with such a
subordinate principle. 1
A variation of the selfishness argument suggests that the purpose
of an income tax is to curtail private consumption so that resources
can be consumed instead by the government. If the purpose of the
income tax is to curtail consumption, then the proper base for the
income tax is personal consumption. However, the second proposi-
tion does not follow from the first. The effect of any tax is to cur-
tail private consumption. 32 Moreover, to assert that the purpose of
income tax is merely to curtail private consumption presupposes
that the pre-tax distribution of income is just.
C. Ability to Pay
The most frequently cited maxim of tax fairness is that tax bur-
dens should be apportioned according to a taxpayer's relative abil-
ity to pay. Consider individual A who earns and spends $20,000 in
year one and individual B who earns $100,000 but only spends
$20,000. It appears obvious that B has a greater ability to pay tax
than A and that such greater ability will be reflected by an accre-
31 See pp. 3-4 supra.
See Andrews, supra note 20, at 1165-66:
The primary, intended, real effect of any general revenue-raising tax is to curtail
some part of the private consumption of economic resources that would otherwise
occur, in order to free those resources for public use, including redistribution to the
poor. If the purpose is to curtail consumption, then it is presumptively fair and effi-
cient to distribute the burden of the tax proportionately or progressively in relation
to levels of consumption prior to imposition of the tax.
However, Andrews confuses effect and purpose. For an interesting discussion, see Kelman,
Personal Deductions Revisited. Why They Fit Poorly in an "Ideal" Income Tax and Why
They Fit Worse in a Far From Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REv. 831, 851-56 (1979).
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tion-type income tax but not by a consumption-type income tax.
Suppose, however, that we change the facts as follows. In year
one A earns $20,000, representing the investment return on inher-
ited property having at the beginning of the year a fair market
value of $1,000,000. A spends the $20,000 and invades his inherited
estate to spend an additional $100,000. While A has chosen not to
work during year one, he possesses a scarce talent-the ability to
perform neurosurgery-which gives him the ability to earn at least
$200,000 a year if he so chooses. Individual B, however, has no
prior savings or inheritance to draw upon and has no greater earn-
ing power than that reflected in his $100,000 .earnings in year one.
Given these facts it is clear that A has a much greater ability to
pay than B, yet an accretion base would impose a greater tax on B.
Proponents of a consumption-type income tax would quickly point
out that under a consumption-type tax A would pay more income
tax than B. In the long-run, then it is argued that a consumption-
type income tax is a better measure of ability to pay.33
There are again obvious problems. In our second example, is A
entitled to the sum he inherited? If not, then the second example
argues not for a consumption tax but for a wealth tax. 4 The more
obvious defect, whether one favors an accretion or consumption
base, is an explanation of why relative ability to pay is an appro-
priate standard to apply. Let us now examine utilitarianism to see
if a persuasive supporting moral framework does exist.
D. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism is currently the dominant theory of political mo-
rality-a theory which is attacked by both Dworkin and Rawls3 5
Utilitarianism has its roots in the work of Jeremy Bentham who
believed that man was governed by "two sovereign masters, pain
and pleasure."6 All men seek to maximize their pleasure and min-
imize their pain. Therefore, any private or governmental action,
any law, and any political structure is to be judged "according to
the tendency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the
See BLUEPRINTS, supra note 1, at 39-40.
For a discussion of the interrelationship between taxes on consumption, accretion, and
wealth, see Warren, supra note 16, at 1121-24.
35 R. DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY ix-xi, 233, 238 (1977); J. RAWLS, supra note 6,
at 26-27, 187-88.
36 BENTHAM'S POLITICAL THOUGHT 66 (B. Parekh ed. 1973).
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happiness of the party whose interest is in question." 37 The end of
a just government is "the greatest happiness of the greatest
number."'
In present society there is an inherent conflict between individu-
als. Some, individuals must gain at the expense of others. Who
gains and who loses will depend on a society's mechanism for dis-
tributing rights and duties. If one interprets the principle of utility
as requiring maximization of average utility,3 9 then a distributive
mechanism is just if it maximizes average hapiness.
The difficulty with utilitarianism lies in measuring utility. Is not
happiness subjective rather than objective, and thus incapable of
measurement? Following Bentham, economic utilitarians reason
that money is a satisfactory measure of utility. The more money
one has the more happiness one can obtain. Even if something can-
not be directly obtained with money, one's supply of money is a
fair measure of his access to, and enjoyment of, such nonpur-
chasable items. 0 The equation of money with happiness seems
doubtful. Nonetheless, there is a much greater problem with the
utilitarian analysis. Let us, therefore, continue tracing the argu-
ment so that the larger flaw can be pointed out.
If the money one has determines the amount of his happiness,
the principle of utility requires that the system of taxation used by
society be designed so as to extract an equal sacrifice of each tax-
payer.41 What constitutes an equal sacrifice is dependent on the
ability to pay of each taxpayer.
There are two glaring problems with the utilitarian argument.
One flaw is the absence of any explanation of why the greatest
happiness of the greatest number should be the governing princi-
ple of social justice. We are given no more than a bald assertion
that this principle is self-evidently correct.42 A second flaw is the
-1 Id. at 67.
"Id. at 195.
Classical utilitarianism required maximization of total happiness. If population remains
constant there is no conflict between the principle of average utility and the principle of
maximum total utility.
40 See BENTHAM'S PoLImcAL THOUGHT, supra note 36, at 119-24. Bentham asserted that
money was the best measure of utility-a proposition generally followed by present-day
utilitarians.
41 See W. BLUM & H. KALVEN, supra note 9, at 41-44; t. MUSGRAVE, supra note 21, at 77,
112; IL SIMoNs, supra note 2, at 6-12; BLUEPRMMS, supra note 1, at 3641.
42 On the need to establish the truth or validity of utilitarianism see BRAt', Som- Maa-
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unstated underlying assumption that the pre-tax distribution of in-
come is just.
John Stuart Mill is cited as the father of the equal sacrifice doc-
trine. While his statement of the doctrine,43 coupled with his de-
fense of an exemption from tax of amounts saved," does seem to
ignore or presuppose the justness of the pre-tax distribution of in-
come, such would be an unfair reading of Mill. Rather, Mill advo-
cated equal sacrifice as the basis for taxation only after the condi-
tions of society had been corrected so that the pre-tax distribution
of income would be just.45
Utilitarians are thus consciously or unconsciously engaged in
utopian analysis when they ignore the issue of the justness of pre-
tax income. Properly, a utilitarian must first assess the existing
distribution of pre-tax income and the existing scheme of rights
and duties to determine if they satisfy the principle of utility. If
the existing distribution of income, rights, and duties is found to
be just, then equal sacrifice analysis would be appropriate. Other-
wise a utilitarian must require an accretion-based income tax in
order to achieve an after-tax distribution of income which maxi-
mizes utility and is, therefore, just.
In the final analysis, then, arguments based on alleged discrimi-
nation against those with a relatively greater preference for future
consumption, along with other ad hoc arguments of tax fairness,
such as taxation according to relative ability to pay or according to
relative consumption, are no more than arguments about horizon-
tal equity-about how to treat two taxpayers who are in similar
circumstances in a similar manner. These arguments avoid the
critical question of whether existing distributions of pre-tax in-
come would be just if left undisturbed. Missing is a systematic,
compelling demonstration of the role assigned to the income tax by
rrs oF ONE FORM OF RuLE UTILITARIANISM 39-42 (University of Colorado Series in Philoso-
phy No. 3, 1967).
43 See 2 J. MILL, supra note 7, at 396:
For what reason ought equality to be the rule in matters of taxation? As a govern-
ment ought to make no distinction of persons or classes in the strength of their claims
on it, whatever sacrifices it requires from thbm should be made to bear as nearly as
possible with the same pressure upon all.
4 Id. at 407-08.
45 See 1 J. MILL, supra note 7, at 260-61, for Mill's description of the conditions of society
that must be changed. See also 2 J. MILL, supra note 7, at 411-14, where Mill supports
differential taxation of economic rent.
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society and an explanation of how these maxims help to effectuate
that purpose. In short, missing is the elaboration of a theory of
social justice which supports the use of these maxims.
Moreover, we have seen that while utilitarianism is an intuitively
appealing theory of social justice, it has grave shortcomings. Be-
cause happiness is a subjective state, there is no convincing or re-
producible way to measure it. Thus it is difficult to persuade others
that utility will be maximized by a particular course of action.
Moreover, utilitarianism is presented as self-evidently true. Thus
the theory itself provides no method for discussing the relative
merits of utilitarianism with one who finds another theory of jus-
tice-such as libertarianism-to be self-evidently true. With the
problem now clearly in focus, let us turn to a consideration of the
methodology and principles of social justice advanced by John
Rawls.
1I. THE RAwLSiAN FRAbMWORK
A Theory of Justice, winner of the 1973 Coif Award as the best
book written in law in the three preceding years, is the most im-
portant work of moral philosophy written in this century. No seri-
ous jurisprudential debate can avoid dealing with Rawls's theory of
justice. Rawls builds on the proposition that
society is a cooperative venture for mutual advantage ...
marked by a conflict as well as an identity of interests. There
is an identity of interests since social cooperation makes pos-
sible a better life for all than any would have if each were to
live solely by his own efforts. There is a conflict of interests
since persons are not indifferent as to how the greater benefits
produced by their collaboration are distributed, for in order to
pursue their ends they each prefer a larger to a lesser share. A
set of principles is required for choosing among the various
social arrangements which determine this division of advan-
tages and for underwriting an agreement on the proper dis-
tributive shares. These principles are the principles of social
justice: they provide a way of assigning rights and duties in
the basic institutions of society and they define the appropri-




A. Reflective Equilibrium and Arguments About Justice
Before examining Rawls's principles of social justice, one must
obtain a basic underst manding of the nature and purpose of moral
argument. Moral theories cannot be deduced from principles which
themselves are self-evidently true. We need not, however, be con-
tent with ad hoc moral judgments. Moral theories can be tested,
and in a sense proved, through the process of reflection and philo-
sophical argument.47 Suppose an individual is of the opinion that
only consumption should be taxed-that it is unjust to have an
accretion-based income tax. Any such considered moral judgment
can be thought of as derived from principles of social justice, which
in turn can be thought of as inferences from a body of relevant
theories, such as "a theory of the person, a theory of the role of
morality in society, a body of general social theory, and so on.""
The first task of philosophical argument is to require an individual
to identify and make explicit the conception of justice underlying
his ad hoc moral judgments and to make explicit the even deeper
theories which support this conception of justice. 9
After the individual has in this manner identified what he really
believes to be true, then the process of meaningfully debating and
testing such beliefs can begin. For instance, upon seeing that the
theory of the person underlying a competing theory of justice is
preferable to the theory of the person which underlies his own the-
ory of justice, an individual might choose, or indeed feel compelled,
to revise his own considered judgments and underlying conception
of justice in a way compatible with the preferable theory of the
person. Philosophical argument and adjustments to our set of
moral beliefs should continue until there is no tension between our
considered moral judgments and the underlying moral structure
which we have identified as supporting our moral judgments, and
until there is no tension between this underlying moral structure
and alternative moral structures of which we are aware. At this
46 J. RAWLS, supra note 6, at 4.
47 Id. at 22. But see R. DWORKIN, supra note 35, at 158.
" Daniels, On Some Methods of Ethics and Linguistics, 37 PHILOSOPHICAL STUD. 21, 26
(1980).
49 Id. at 27.
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point we have reached a state of reflective equilibrium, and the
principles of social justice which we hold are the correct ones for us
at that moment in time.50
It is possible that fully rational men, that is, persons who have
expunged all irrational desires through cognitive psychotherapy,
would arrive at the same conclusions as to the correct principles of
social justice after engaging in sufficient philosophical argument.51
This would be the case, for instance, if fully rational persons are by
nature identically benevolent and if all relevant information about
the nature of man and society were made available to them in their
deliberations. 52 Our world is, of course, light years away from hav-
ing a rational, deconditioned, fully educated populace. Further, it
is unclear whether benevolence is an underlying characteristic of
all fully rational, deprogrammed persons.53
This does not, however, undercut the critical importance of phil-
osophical argument for our imperfect world. If your and my con-
sidered moral judgments-for instance, as to whether the income
tax should be imposed on an accretion base or a consumption
base-do not at first coincide, perhaps after we have exposed our
original judgments to the mutual recorisideration required in the
process of reaching reflective equilibrium, we will modify our judg-
ments so that they do coincide." If agreement is not thereby ob-
tained, at least we can identify the deep underlying moral notions
about which we do not agree. Perhaps it will be easier for
others-legislators, for instance-to choose between these compet-
ing deeper moral structures than to choose directly between our
otherwise apparently ad hoc moral judgments.
0 J. RAwLs, supra note 6, at 48.
5, R. BRANDT, A THEORY OF THE GOOD AND THE RIGHT 113 (1979). Brandt maintains that a
person's desires or beliefs are "'rational' if [they] would survive or be produced by careful
'cognitive psychotherapy' for that person." A desire is "'irrational' if it cannot survive com-
patibly with clear and repeated judgements about established facts." Cognitive psychother-
apy is the voluntary "process of confronting desires with relevant information, by repeatedly
representing it, in an ideally vivid way, and at an appropriate time."
52 Id. at 215-17.
5Id. at 217. For a discussion of the modern view that there is no universal human na-
ture, see Ia UNGER, LAW IN MODERN SocIETY 4-6, 40-43 (1976).
" Daniels, Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in Ethics, 76 J. P~t.os-
oPHy 256, 261-62 (1979).
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B. The Original Position
Rawls proposes that we begin our search for principles of social
justice by considering a hypothetical original position where repre-
sentative men gather to agree upon the principles of justice which
will thereafter, for all of time, govern society.5  Our task is to de-
sign this original position, the representatives gathered there, and
the nature of their deliberations in such a way that we will all be
willing to agree, in advance, that the principles of justice resulting
from this hypothetical convention must be "true" principles of jus-
tice 6 In other words, if we can agree on an original position which
accords with our considered judgment as to the proper circum-
stances in which decisions about justice should be made, and which
reflects our theory of the person, of procedural justice, and of the
role of morality in society, then whatever principles of justice
would be chosen in this original position should be the principles
with which we choose to conform our considered moral judgments
in order to reach reflective equilibrium.57
Most theories of procedural justice require impartiality-require
that the judge divorce himself from all facts that might wrongly
influence his decision. The original position is a procedure whereby
we can determine, or at least meaningfully argue about, the princi-
ples of justice that impartial persons would choose. Moreover, the
structure of the original position reflects the independent theory
that impartiality is a requirement of procedural justice.58
In order to insure impartiality in the original position, those pre-
sent must operate behind a veil of ignorance. They have no knowl-
edge of their own abilities or of their actual place in society. They
know the basic theories of human psychology, economics, and so-
cial structure, but they do not know their own particular views or
psychological eccentricities.5 9 In short, those present in the original
position know nothing about themselves which would cause them
J. RAWLS, supra note 6, at 21, 135.
We are of course not interested in logically empty truth. Rather, as stated in H. MAR-
CUSE, supra note 14, at 235, we aim at the truth which is obtained by principles of justice
that prove useful in achieving "the satisfaction of man's material needs, the rational organi-
zation of the realm of necessity."
" J. RAWLS, supra note 6, at 120.
" Id. at 187.
8 Id. at 142.
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to be biased in the selection of principles of justice.6 0
Those present in the original position are deemed to be inter-
ested in furthering their own life plans."' Each wants more instead
of less of the primary social goods-"rights and liberties, opportu-
nities and powers, income and wealth"-because having more of
these goods will increase the chances of fulfilling their life plans.2
While the representative men are not interested in the life plans of
others per se, they understand that mutual cooperation makes pos-
sible a better life than if each lived separately by his own efforts.
They are, therefore, desirous of reaching an agreement on fair
terms of social cooperation.6 3
The deliberators in the original position are to choose permanent
principles of justice for society.6 The deliberators are keenly aware
that they must be prepared to live with these principles, and with
the assignment of rights and duties and the division of the societal
pie which they require, no matter what position in society they
should find themselves to actually occupy. Collateral to this is the
realization that the principles of justice chosen must result in a
stable society and must therefore be designed to draw forth the
willing cooperation of every member of society, no matter what his
lot.65
The original position is thus designed so that the representative
men present are morally equal individuals. The life plan of each
deliberator is important in and of itself, and thus no representative
is willing to agree to principles which would allow men to be used,
and their life plans sacrificed, as a mere means toward someone
else's end.68 Each deliberator is desirous of obtaining the benefits
of societal cooperation, and because of the veil of ignorance the
terms agreed to will be arrived at impartially.
C. The Principles of Social Justice
The derivation of principles of social justice follows naturally
from the original position. Because the deliberators are morally
e Id. at 19.
e Id. at 127.







equal, and because they do not know what position they hold in
existing society or what their personal talents and psychological ec-
centricities are, they will initially agree that all liberty and all ad-
vantages wrung from social cooperation should be divided and dis-
tributed equally. Knowing that they will be forced to live with
their lot in actual society, the parties will be unwilling to agree
that some should have more than others. Even if a participant
might wish that he could be rich, he cannot afford to gamble that
he might end up as the poorest of the poor.67
However, the possibility exists under general theories of psychol-
ogy and economics, which theories would be known to the partici-
pants, that a larger societal pie, a larger sum of primary social
goods, could be achieved if some members of society were allowed
to have more primary social goods than others. If incentives were
provided for extra work or difficult work, more of such work might
be done, making everyone better off in the process. Some deliber-
ators would object that no proof exists that man in fact is so base
as to require a greater share of society's goods before he will do his
share of socially necessary tasks. All would be forced to agree, how-
ever, that given existing theories of human psychology the possibil-
ity cannot be ruled out that incentives, and thus inequalities,
might prove to be socially necessary. The initial decision in favor
of equality was based on the parties' interest in having the best
possible life prospects whatever their actual lot in life should turn
out to be. If allowing inequalities would result in better life pros-
pects for those drawing the worst hand, the deliberators in the
original position would want such inequalities to be allowed. 8 The
deliberators would eventually agree, therefore, to a governing prin-
ciple of social justice calculated to safeguard their life prospects.
"All social primary goods-liberty and opportunity, income and
wealth, and the bases of self-respect-are to be distributed equally
unless an unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the
advantage of the least favored."69 Rawls terms this general rule the
6 Id. at 150-51.
Id. at 151-61.
eg Id. at 303. This is Rawls's general statement of the principle of social justice. In ideal
theory Rawls defines the difference principle more narrowly: "Social and economic inequali-
ties are to be arranged so that they are. . . to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged."
In this special conception the difference principle is constrained by two higher principles:
(a) Positions must be fairly open to all; (b) Each person shall have equal basic liberties. Id.
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difference principle. Any difference in wealth, income, power, or
opportunity-that is, any inequality-is just only if allowing the
difference maximizes the life prospects of the least advantaged.7
D. The Purpose of the Income Tax
In a society structured in accordance with the difference princi-
ple the purpose of taxation is both "to preserve an approximate
justice in distributive shares" and "to raise the revenues that jus-
tice requires. ' 71 Income is a primary social good, representing a
person's distributive share of society's current product. A person's
income is just only to the extent it satisfies the difference principle.
If the before-tax distributive shares of income do not satisfy the
difference principle, then an income tax is the mechanism used by
society to make the after-tax shares of income just. The rate of
income tax must be calculated to produce the maximum revenues
for transfer to the least advantaged, taking into account any disin-
centive effects. The income tax extracted from an individual's
gross income represents a sum of money to which the taxpayer is
not morally entitled, and to which others, the least advantaged, do
have a moral claim. The sum remaining after the payment of in-
come tax, assuming the income tax has been levied at rates and in
a manner required by the difference principle, is a sum to which
the taxpayer may claim moral entitlement.
Many of us, either instinctively or after philosophical argument,
will find that our considered moral judgments are in reflective
equilibrium and include the difference principle and the belief that
the purpose of the income tax is to extract from a taxpayer the
portion of pre-tax income to which he is not morally entitled. Fur-
ther, for many of the individuals holding these moral views, the
present pre-tax, pre-transfer payment, distribution of income
would be viewed as violative of the difference principle, and, there-
fore, unjust. Accordingly an accretion-based income tax would be
viewed as required by justice. 3
In a totally just society, however, even those who believe in the
at 302.
70 Id. at 75-80.
7 Id. at 277, 278.
72 Id. at 277-79.
" See pp. 3-4 supra.
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difference principle might prefer a consumption-type income tax.
In such a utopia, the background conditions for a just society
would be satisfied. All positions would be fairly open to all. Each
citizen would receive adequate prenatal care (including correction
of genetic defects), adequate early childhood care and experiences,
and educational opportunities appropriate to their needs and tal-
ents. Moreover, the monetary rewards available for a given unit of
work would presumably be the same, except perhaps for overtime
or hazardous duty pay. Transfer payments would undoubtedly still
be required for the victims of misfortune, and governmental reve-
nues would of course be needed for public goods. However, in such
a utopia, the income tax would merely be a revenue raising device,
because gross income would be deserved and justly held.
In such a utopia, taxes would be levied proportionately, either on
a lump-sum basis or in proportion to some appropriate, horizon-
tally equitable standard. The range of just definitions of income
would not be limited to an accretion concept. A consideration of
subordinate arguments of efficiency, equity, and practicability
would then be appropriate.7 4 Perhaps, as Rawls suggests, the
choice made in such a just society would be a consumption-type
income tax. 5
IV. MEANINGFUL DISCUSSION OF QUESTIONS OF JUSTICE
A. Libertarianism
Diametrically opposed to the difference principle is libertarian-
ism-the theory of natural liberty. In a society structured in accor-
dance with the principles of natural liberty each person is consid-
ered morally entitled to his natural talents and abilities and to
whatever reward he is able to obtain through free exchange with
others. Whatever distribution of income or other primary social
goods results from a system of free exchange is necessarily just and
the needs of the least advantaged are left to charity."8 For some
libertarians the justness of these personal entitlements is self-evi-
74 Id.
11 See J. RAWLS, supra note 6, at 278-80. The key point to realize is that Rawls advocates
a consumption-type tax only for a society in which pre-tax income is justly distributed.
76 R. NozIcK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 265-68 (1974); Posner, Utilitarianism, Eco-
nomics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 103, 135 (1979).
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dent, and not derived from higher principles of justice.7 7 Others
justify a system of natural liberty by asserting that in the long run
everyone will be better off under a system of natural liberty.7 8
Under a libertarian theory of justice, the pre-tax distribution of
income is just if it is the product of a formally free market. Thus,
even if a particular distribution of income is the result of business
monopoly or other types of unequal bargaining relationships, the
libertarian will believe that the distribution of income is just and
should not be disturbed.7 9 Necessarily, then, a libertarian will be-
lieve that the choice of a proper base for the income tax is not
limited and that the governing maxim for designing the income tax
is the requirement that the just pre-tax distribution of income not
be disturbed by the tax imposed.
It can thus be seen that the central dispute between proponents
of the difference principle and proponents of libertarianism con-
cerns the conditions under which one can claim moral entitlement
to his or her distributive share of income. Advocates of the differ-
ence principle believe that an unequal distribution of any primary
social good is unjust unless allowing such inequality is to the bene-
fit of the least advantaged. Necessarily, an advocate of the differ-
ence principle believes that one does not deserve those personal
attributes which enable one to earn a greater amount of money
than others. Instead these assets are the result of factors which are
morally arbitrary. Conversely, a libertarian believes that individu-
als are entitled to their natural assets.
B. Argument at the Ad Hoc Level
At the level of our ad hoc moral judgments we do feel some
moral entitlement to our income5 0 However, on reflection we may
be unwilling to say that our income is a measure of our moral
worth. Consider the declining income of an athlete as his natural
talents erode with age. Surely his moral worth does not diminish
R. NoZIcK, supra note 76, at 10-12, 89-90.
For instance, Posner, supra note 76, at 132.
[L]awfully obtained wealth is created only by doing things for other people-offering
them advantageous trades. The individual may be completely selfish but he cannot,
in a well-regulated market economy, promote his self-interest without benefiting
others as well as himself.
79 See Kennedy, supra note 28, at 1735-36.
80 J. RAwLs, supra note 6. at 311.
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apace. On further reflection we realize that the athlete's natural
talents were the result of genetic and environmental factors over
which he had no control. Moreover, his income is dependent on a
scheme of social cooperation that safeguards his personal liberty
and establishes his rights to hold property. As our good looks, tal-
ent, age, health, and positions are so greatly influenced by the luck
of the draw, by morally arbitrary contingencies, how can we claim
that any sum which we can extort for our services or the use of our
property is a sum to which we are justly entitled?
The libertarian will quickly respond that we have missed the
point. The claim is not that we are entitled to our income because
we deserve our natural talents. Rather we are entitled to our in-
come because we exercise our talents in a relationship of voluntary
exchange with others. It is the productive act and its product to
which we are entitled. 1
The first step in this argument rests on the moral notion of au-
tonomy. No one may justly perform a lobotomy on Albert Einstein
to neutralize his greater intelligence. Nor may we force him to ex-
ercise his talent in our behalf.82 If we induce Einstein to volunta-
rily exercise his talents in our behalf, is he not entitled to the
agreed reward?83
This, indeed, is an appealing argument; for none of us wish to be
forced to work, or to be lobotomized. Nor do we wish to have
someone welch on a voluntarily arrived-at bargain. Moreover, most
of us believe that the effort expended in productive activity, or the
mere fact of being productive, must result in moral entitlement to
the reward received.8 4 However, while we can all agree that a per-
son is entitled to retain his natural assets and to determine
whether or not to use them, the second step-that he is entitled to
the entire agreed reward-does not follow from the first.
It must be remembered that society is a cooperative venture.
The regime of rights and duties and the willing cooperation of soci-
ety's members make possible a much larger societal pie than could
be achieved in a state of nature. A person agrees to perform ser-
31 R. NOZICK, supra note 76, at 225.
82 Id. at 229.
83 Id. at 224-27.
" This notion is elevated by Posner to the point where a person's morality is a function
of his "capacity to produce for others." Posner, The Ethical and Political Basis of the Effi-
ciency Norm in Common Law Adjudication, 8 HOFsTRA L. REV. 487, 499 (1980).
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vices in the context of the existing regime of rights and duties. Ac-
cordingly, a person is entitled to receive and retain for his services
that which he could legitimately have expected to receive and re-
tain when he performed the services, based on the just social ar-
rangement then in existence.8 5
What a person can legitimately expect to receive for his services
is dependent on whether the pre-tax distribution of income is just.
If it is not, and if the society is justly designed, an accretion-based
income tax will be a part of the existing social arrangement. A per-
son entering into an income-producing activity in such a society
would expect to receive only a net reward-the gross amount paid
for such services, less the income tax extracted.88 Indeed, for most
individuals in our society, the withholding system insures that a
net reward is all that ever passes into a taxpayer's hands. If the
existing income tax is just, then this net reward is just.
The ad hoc argument which we have traced has come full circle.
Some light has been shed on the dispute between advocates of lib-
ertarianism and advocates of the difference principle (or similar
liberal theories of justice). Nonetheless, the deeper theories under-
lying these diametrically opposed theories have not been exposed
to meaningful debate, and without such debate we cannot hope to
determine true principles of social justice or convince others of
such truth. Let us now consider the possibility of utilizing the
Rawlsian framework for comparative philosophical analysis.87
C. Required Visitation of the Original Position
Rawls's theory of social justice gives us a standard against which
to measure the justness of the pre-tax distribution-a standard
that many of us will find intuitively appealing. More importantly,
Rawls has laid bare the entire supporting framework of his theory
and given us the key so that we may enter the original position
ourselves. Accordingly, the original position can help us reach a
state of reflective equilibrium and gives us a means of explaining to
J. RAwLs, supra note 6, at 311.
The present system allows the extraction of FICA taxes and various state income taxes.
Presumably these taxes should be incorporated within the federal income tax in an imper-
fect society structured in accordance with the difference principle.
8For an argument that the Rawlsian framework can lead to "correct" moral theories, see
Fried, The Laws of Change: The Cunning of Reason in Moral and Legal History, 9 J. LE.
GAL STUD. 335, 341-45 (1979).
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others how we reached that state.
The design of the original position reflects "a theory of the per-
son, a theory of procedural justice, general social theory, and a the-
ory of the role of morality in society (including the ideal of a well-
ordered society)."88 From the original position representing these
background conditions a set of moral principles can be derived, in-
cluding a theory of social justice. The theory of social justice de-
rived can then be tested for compatibility with our ad hoc moral
judgments, and the adjustments necessary to reach reflective equi-
librium can be made.89
The crucial justificatory force of the original position device lies
in the independence of our ad hoc moral judgments and the deeper
theories underlying the design of the original position.90 Thus the
process of reaching reflective equilibrium is not merely a circular
process whereby our ad hoc moral judgments are plugged into the
design of the original position and then regurgitated back out in
the form of moral principles consistent with our preexisting ad hoc
moral judgments. Instead, the original position reflects indepen-
dent, deeper theories with no connection to our ad hoc moral judg-
ments other than the connection which we produce by the process
of reflection. Moreover, the original position allows us to draw on
our deeper theories of the person, procedural justice, general social
theory, and the role of morality in society, even if it would be im-
possible for us to otherwise fully and coherently describe what
these theories are. This is so because these theories are necessarily
reflected in the design of the original position.
The utility of the original position as a replicable framework for
comparative philosophical argument is therefore evident.91 Those
with differing theories of social justice can mutually test their the-
ories by designing an original position within which their theories
could be logically derived. Arguing about the design of and deliber-
ation within the original position allows conflicts at the level of ad
hoc moral judgments to be temporarily laid aside and provides a
means of indirectly, and thus less confrontationally, determining if
88 Daniels, supra note 54, at 260.
89 Id. at 258-61.
90 Id. at 259-60.
91 For Rawls's description of the utility of the original position as a device for compara.
tive philosophical argument, see J. RAWLS, supra note 6, at 121-22.
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the underlying moral structures are also at loggerheads. If one
finds that a theory of justice which he holds could not be derived
from an original position designed in a manner which appeals to
his sense of justice, then presumably he will adjust his theory of
justice accordingly.
Let us suppose that my considered moral judgments are in con-
flict with the difference principle. I dearly hold to the belief that I
am morally entitled to every last penny of the $500,000 in pre-tax
income which I receive annually, and that the income taxes I pay
are immorally extracted from me.9 2 I have listened to the ad hoc
moral arguments made by proponents of the difference principle,
and I remain unconvinced. At the ad hoc level I reject the differ-
ence principle and continue to embrace libertarianism. Moreover, I
have listened carefully to your description of how the difference
principle is derivable from the Rawlsian original position. You
have now asked me to explain where you have gone wrong in your
analysis-to point out what is incorrect about the original position
you have designed. You have also invited me to enter the original
position and explain how my libertarian principles are derived.
Must I attempt to find mistakes in your reasoning or in the design
of your original position? Must I enter the original position and
attempt to develop a coherent theory of justice which supports my
ad hoc moral views? What if I refuse?
It is my considered moral judgment that one who asserts the cor-
rectness of a particular moral code or moral judgment must either
expose and explain the entirety of the moral structure which sup-
ports his assertions or forfeit any claim to our attention or consid-
eration.9 Any particular distribution of income is enforced by the
power of the state, but is just only if that power has been justly
exercised. Those who benefit from existing society occupy a posi-
tion of power in relation to others by virtue of this governmental
mechanism." Thus, while "citizens need not talk about many
things, they must respond when somebody challenges the legiti-
macy of their power position."95 This is so because "it is only the
failure to answer the question of legitimacy that conclusively es-
"See J. HosPERs, LmERTARIANISM 207-10 (1971).
93 See B. AcKERmAN, SOCIL JUSTICE IN THE LmERAL STATE 371-74 (1980).
- Id. at 4-5, 89.
Il Id. at 372-73.
19811
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW
tablishes the illegitimacy of an exercise of power.""0
This obligation to meaningfully discuss and debate issues of
public policy is also a practical necessity. Lawyers, trained in the
Socratic method, have an almost instinctive aversion to dogma.
Suppose Professor Andrews, when asked to explain in detail the
philosophical structure which supports his considered moral belief
in the preeminent justness of a consumption-type income tax,
should refuse, declaring that his considered moral judgments are
self-evidently correct and that discussion is therefore unneces-
sary.9' I submit that in the eyes of most of us his arguments in
favor of a consumption-type income tax would thereafter be given
substantially less credence.
The next question, of course, is whether persons who recognize
the moral and practical obligation to engage in meaningful debate,
and thus to answer meaningful questions, would feel constrained to
enter the original position if asked to do so. If asked what design of
the original position justifies one's theory of justice, would most of
us agree that this is a meaningful question that must be answered?
If the answer is yes, then the original position represents a promis-
ing tool for extending the field of meaningful debate beyond the
deadlock between competing ad hoc moral judgments. 8
There is no clear answer to this question. It is my considered
judgment that the answer is yes. However, those who are afraid to
expose their theories or moral judgments to the possible adverse
consequences resulting from entering the original position will vig-
orously disparage the validity or utility of the original position as a
device for meaningful philosophical argument.9 9 The only response
to these attacks is education and perseverance. Those who chal-
lenge the utility of the original position, or of philosophical argu-
ment generally, must be challenged at every turn.100 Conceivably,
11 Id. at 373.
9' I do not intend to imply that Professor Andrews would refuse to respond. Having been
challenged by Professor Warren's assertion of ad hoc maxims of justice, see Warren, supra
note 1, he responded in kind. See Andrews, supra note 13, at 949-50.
" See pp. 11-12, 15-16 supra.
" See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN, supra note 93, at 339-40; R. BRANDT, supra, note 51, at 234-45;
Posner, supra note 84, at 498-99.
100 The examples of confused attacks on the meaning, purpose, and value of the original
position are many. In order to elevate the original position to a point of acceptability where
none can refuse to enter its doors, these attacks must be carefully refuted. Dworkin, for
example, believes that entering the original position adds nothing to the argument for a
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as familiarity with the original position device grows, it will be-
come impossible to refuse a request that one enter the original po-
sition, because failure to do so will be generally viewed as an un-
willingness to engage in meaningful debate. If this state of affairs is
to occur, it will be the result of the positive gains in meaningful
discussion which use of the original position can be shown to pro-
duce. Let us now turn to a brief description of how the original
position must be designed in order to produce a libertarian theory
of justice. It is hoped that this sketch will constitute a provocative
indication of the utility of the original position device.
D. Libertarianism and the Original Position
In the original position chosen by Rawls, the deliberators are ra-
tional, mutually disinterested, reasonably risk-averse individuals,
interested in furthering their own life plans, who have come to-
gether behind a veil of ignorance to choose, unanimously and once
and for all, the principles of social justice. They know that their
society is characterized by conditions of moderate scarcity. Thus
conflicts will arise as to the allocation of resources and positions.
The principles of social justice must be drawn so as to elicit the
willing cooperation of all members of society even if the allocation
of primary social goods that they receive is less than they would
desire. Otherwise the society will be inherently unstable.101
How must the design of the original position and the deliber-
ators therein be changed in order to produce agreement on the
particular principle that could not be accomplished by asserting that the proposed solution
was "obviously fair and sensible." This is so, says Dworkin, because we will not find instruc-
tive what a person would have agreed to in advance in a hypothetical situation. R. DwonmN,
supra note 35, at 151, 152. However, the example used by Dworkin to prove this point is
totally misleading.
Suppose I did not know the value of my painting on Monday; if you had offered me
$100 for it then I would have accepted. On Tuesday I discovered it was valuable. You
cannot argue that it would be fair for the courts to make me sell it to you for $100 on
Wednesday. It may be my good fortune that you did not ask me on Monday, but that
does not justify coercion against me later.
Id. at 152. Most of us will agree with Dworkin's analysis. However, it has nothing to do with
the original position. The example presupposes private property rights, the right to freely
dispose of property, and just entitlement of the individual to the painting. In short, the
example presupposes an existing just institutional framework, and it is only for the purposes
of testing the justness of the distributive mechanism of society and the theories of social
justice on which they are based, that the original position is intended.
101 See text accompanying notes 55-66 supra.
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principles of natural liberty? Let us look first at the characteristics
of the original position.
The Rawlsian formulation of self-interested individuals con-
cerned primarily with furthering their own ends and having at
their command as many primary social goods as possible does not
at first seem inconsistent with a system of natural liberty-a sys-
tem with only the minimal regime of property rights and police
protection necessary for the operation of a free market within
which each citizen may develop and exploit his natural talents.
The deliberators will quickly realize, however, that they are (be-
cause of the veil of ignorance) unaware of their natural talents and
of their starting places in society. Further, they are aware that a
system of natural liberty coupled with conditions of moderate scar-
city is certain to result in miserable times for many of the deliber-
ators when they resume their lives in existing society.102 In order
for the deliberators to be willing to enter into an agreement which
will subject them to such a possibility, the characteristics of the
deliberators must be changed.
One possibility is to posit that the deliberators are not only in-
terested in furthering their own life plans but also believe that
one's natural talents are an accurate reflection of one's moral
worth. Deliberators with these two characteristics could willingly
accept the risks of a system of natural liberty because they would
view the possibility of a miserable life not as a risk, but, should it
occur, as their just desert. This change in the nature of the deliber-
ators is most unconvincing for we have seen that at the level of ad
hoc argument libertarians will acknowledge that natural talents are
not deserved and do not reflect moral worth.103 It is most unlikely,
therefore, that a libertarian would seriously suggest this design
change.
A second possibility is to posit that the deliberators are not only
interested in receiving the largest possible distributive share of pri-
mary social goods but also are totally risk-indifferent. Given these
two characteristics it is not implausible that the deliberators, being
indifferent to the possibility of a miserable life, might select a sys-
tem of natural liberty as offering the best chance of reaching their
102 The deliberators know the general facts and theories about human existence. J.
RAWLS, supra note 6, at 142.
"' See text accompanying note 81 supra.
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goal. However, the Rawlsian deliberators were deemed to have
family ties and thus to have some ties of sentiment to others.",
This characteristic would cause the deliberators to be concerned
with the possibility that a miserable life might befall those for
whom they care. Accordingly the deliberators must be character-
ized as single individuals, without ties of friendship or family
which might dampen their enthusiasms for a system of natural
liberty.
These cold-blooded, risk-indifferent deliberators do not reflect
an intuitively appealing theory of the person. Moreover, it can be
doubted that there is such a thing as a totally risk-indifferent per-
son. Even Evel Knievel took a parachute. Accordingly, if we are to
derive libertarian principles of justice from a morally appealing
original position, we will have to restore to the deliberators their
Rawlsian characteristics and instead change other features of the
original position.
Let us now, as Richard Posner advocates," 5 lift the veil of igno-
rance and allow the deliberators to know their real characteristics
and situation in life. Now that the deliberators are aware of their
natural talents and their existing places in society it is totally im-
plausible that they will reach unanimous agreement on a system of
natural liberty. There are miserable stations in life which some de-
liberators now know that they occupy and will insist upon leaving.
There is nothing intuitively appealing about a system of natural
liberty unless you occupy a preferred position or feel reasonably
confident that you soon will. Indeed, if all existing persons were
shepherded to a desert island from which they could leave only
after agreeing unanimously to governing principles of social justice,
it is most unlikely that Richard Posner or Milton Friedman, con-
fronted by the starving multitudes of the world, and desirous of
surviving the day, would push very loudly, or very long, for a sys-
tem of natural liberty.
So while Posner prefers the consent which would be produced
absent the veil of ignorance, 108 he is certain to be disappointed if
he believes that the unanimous agreement reached would counte-
nance a system of natural liberty. For the participants in our origi-
104 J. RAWLS, supra note 6, at 128-29.




nal position are not bound by the preexisting distribution of rights
and advantages. The agreement that would be reached by real in-
dividuals, aware of their present abilities and stations in life, would
inevitably involve compromise and a redistributive mechanism
which insures greater life prospects for the least advantaged.
We can now see that a key moral characteristic of the original
position is the fact that, regardless of all other design changes, it
requires uncoerced consent to principles of justice. Unless we are
willing to say and believe that uncoerced consent is not a prerequi-
site to valid principles of justice, then we cannot derive libertarian
principles of justice in an original position peopled by rational, rea-
sonably risk-averse, reasonably human persons. Nor does the an-
swer differ if the original position is the real world. Rather, the
original position device makes clear that a system of natural lib-
erty can be the product of uncoerced agreement only in the imagi-
nations of those who hold, and cherish, privileged positions in
society.
V. CONCLUSION
It is surprising the extent to which tax policy debate presently
avoids a systematic philosophical consideration of the require-
ments of justice. This article has demonstrated that a determina-
tion of the proper base for the income tax is open for debate only
if the existing pre-tax distribution of income is just. If it is not,
then justice requires the employment of an accretion-based income
tax to make the after-tax distribution of income just.
Further, this article has demonstrated how philosophical argu-
ment can be meaningfully and easily conducted by using the origi-
nal position device advocated by John Rawls. While it is not
claimed that theories of justice can thereby be proved, 10 7 it is sug-
gested that full elaboration of the theories of social justice which
underlie a given proposal will result in greater societal consensus
as to the governing principles of social justice. It is also suggested
that for those who desire to enter the tax policy arena, engaging in
argument not only qt the technical level, but' also at the deeper
level of underlying moral theory, will result in coherent, widely un-
derstandable proposals, rather than esoteric recommendations
which only appeal to the initiated.
107 But see Fried, supra note 87, at 341-45.
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